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6b3246a6d3
Refactors the secrurity documentation to be up-to-date and conform to our style guidelines. Additionally went over each part and reworded things that needed it.
374 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
374 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
---
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layout: default
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title: Security Measures
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parent: Security
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nav_order: 1
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---
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# Security Measures
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## Protection against cookie theft
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Authelia sets several key cookie attributes to prevent cookie theft:
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1. `HttpOnly` is set forbidding client-side code like javascript from access to the cookie.
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2. `Secure` is set forbidding the browser from sending the cookie to sites which do not use the https scheme.
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3. `SameSite` is by default set to `Lax` which prevents it being sent over cross-origin requests.
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Read about these attributes in detail on the
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[MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Set-Cookie).
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## Protection against multi-domain cookie attacks
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Since Authelia uses multi-domain cookies to perform single sign-on, an attacker who poisoned a user's DNS cache can
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easily retrieve the user's cookies by making the user send a request to one of the attacker's IPs.
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This is technically mitigated by the `Secure` attribute set in cookies by Authelia, however it's still advisable to
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only use HTTPS connections with valid certificates and enforce it with HTTP Strict Transport Security ([HSTS]) which
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will prevent domains from serving over HTTP at all as long as the user has visited the domain before. This means even
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if the attacker poisons DNS they are unable to get modern browsers to connect to a compromised host unless they can also
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obtain the certificate.
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Note that using [HSTS] has consequences. That's why you should read the blog post nginx has written on [HSTS].
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## Protection against username enumeration
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Authelia adaptively delays authentication attempts based on the mean (average) of the previous 10 successful attempts
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in addition to a small random interval of time. The result of this delay is that it makes it incredibly difficult to
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determine if the unsuccessful login was the result of a bad password, a bad username, or both. The random interval of
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time is anything between 0 milliseconds and 85 milliseconds.
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When Authelia first starts it assumes the last 10 attempts took 1000 milliseconds each. As users login successfully it
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quickly adjusts to the actual time the login attempts take. This process is independent of the login backend you have
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configured.
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The cost of this is low since in the instance of a user not existing it just stops processing the request to delay the
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login. Lastly the absolute minimum time authentication can take is 250 milliseconds. Both of these measures also have
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the added effect of creating an additional delay for all authentication attempts increasing the time that a brute-force
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attack will take, this combined with regulation greatly delays brute-force attacks and the effectiveness of them in
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general.
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## Protections against password cracking (File authentication provider)
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Authelia implements a variety of measures to prevent an attacker cracking passwords if they somehow obtain the file used
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by the file authentication provider, this is unrelated to LDAP auth.
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First and foremost Authelia only uses very secure hashing algorithms with sane and secure defaults. The first and
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default hashing algorithm we use is Argon2id which is currently considered the most secure hashing algorithm. We also
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support SHA512, which previously was the default.
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Secondly Authelia uses salting with all hashing algorithms. These salts are generated with a random string generator,
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which is seeded every time it's used by a cryptographically secure 1024bit prime number. This ensures that even if an
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attacker obtains the file, each password has to be brute forced individually.
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Lastly Authelia's implementation of Argon2id is highly tunable. You can tune the key length, salt used, iterations
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(time), parallelism, and memory usage. To read more about this please read how to
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[configure](../configuration/authentication/file.md) file authentication.
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## User profile and group membership always kept up-to-date (LDAP authentication provider)
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This measure is unrelated to the File authentication provider.
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Authelia by default refreshes the user's profile and membership every 5 minutes. This ensures that if you alter a users
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groups in LDAP that their new groups are obtained relatively quickly in order to adjust their access level for
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applications secured by Authelia.
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Additionally, it will invalidate any session where the user could not be retrieved from LDAP based on the user filter,
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for example if they were deleted or disabled provided the user filter is set correctly. These updates occur when a user
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accesses a resource protected by Authelia. This means you should ensure disabled users or users with expired passwords
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are not obtainable using the LDAP filter, the default filter for Active Directory implements this behaviour.
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LDAP implementations vary, so please ask if you need some assistance in configuring this.
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These protections can be [tuned](../configuration/authentication/ldap.md#refresh-interval) according to your security
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policy by changing refresh_interval, however we believe that 5 minutes is a fairly safe interval.
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## Notifier security measures (SMTP)
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The SMTP Notifier implementation does not allow connections that are not secure without changing default configuration
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values.
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As such all SMTP connections require the following:
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1. TLS Connection (STARTTLS or SMTPS) has been negotiated before authentication or sending emails (unauthenticated
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connections require it as well)
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2. Valid X509 Certificate presented to the client during the TLS handshake
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There is an option to disable both of these security measures however they are **not recommended**.
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The following configuration options exist to configure the security level in order of most preferable to least
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preferable:
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### Configuration Option: certificates_directory
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You can [configure a directory](../configuration/miscellaneous.md#certificates_directory) of certificates for Authelia
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to trust. These certificates can either be CA's or individual public certificates that should be trusted. These
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are added in addition to the environments PKI trusted certificates if available. This is useful for trusting a
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certificate that is self-signed without drastically reducing security. This is the most recommended workaround to not
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having a valid PKI trusted certificate as it gives you complete control over which ones are trusted without disabling
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critically needed validation of the identity of the target service.
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Read more in the [documentation](../configuration/miscellaneous.md#certificates_directory) for this option.
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### Configuration Option: tls.skip_verify
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The [tls.skip_verify](../configuration/notifier/smtp.md#tls) option allows you to skip verifying the certificate
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entirely which is why [certificates_directory](#configuration-option-certificates_directory) is preferred over this.
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This will effectively mean you cannot be sure the certificate is valid which means an attacker via DNS poisoning or MITM
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attacks could intercept emails from Authelia compromising a user's security without their knowledge.
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### Configuration Option: disable_require_tls
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Authelia by default ensures that the SMTP server connection is secured via STARTTLS or SMTPS prior to sending sensitive
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information. The [disable_require_tls](../configuration/notifier/smtp.md#disable_require_tls) disables this requirement
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which means the emails are sent in plain text. This is the least secure option as it effectively removes the validation
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of SMTP certificates and removes the encryption offered by the STARTTLS/SMTPS connection all together.
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This means not only can the vulnerabilities of the [skip_verify](#configuration-option-tlsskip_verify) option be
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exploited, but any router or switch along the route of the email which receives the packets could be used to silently
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exploit the plain text nature of the email. This is only usable currently with authentication disabled (comment out the
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password) and as such is only an option for SMTP servers that allow unauthenticated relay (bad practice).
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### SMTPS vs STARTTLS
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All connections start as plain text and are upgraded via STARTTLS. SMTPS is an exception to this rule where the
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connection is over TLS. As SMTPS is deprecated, the only way to configure this is to set the SMTP
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[port](../configuration/notifier/smtp.md#port) to the officially recognized SMTPS port of 465 which will cause Authelia
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to automatically consider it to be a SMTPS connection. As such your SMTP server, if not offering SMTPS, should not be
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listening on port 465 which is bad practice anyway.
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## Additional security
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### Reset Password
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It's possible to disable the reset password functionality and is an optional adjustment to consider for anyone wanting
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to increase security. See the [configuration](../configuration/authentication/index.md#disable_reset_password) for more
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information.
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### Session security
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We have a few options to configure the security of a session. The main and most important one is the session secret.
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This is used to encrypt the session data when it is stored in the [Redis](../configuration/session/redis.md) key value
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database. The value of this option should be long and as random as possible. See more in the
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[documentation](../configuration/session/index.md#secret) for this option.
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The validity period of session is highly configurable. For example in a highly security conscious domain you could
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set the session [remember_me_duration](../configuration/session/index.md#remember_me_duration) to 0 to disable this
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feature, and set the [expiration](../configuration/session/index.md#expiration) to 2 hours and the
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[inactivity](../configuration/session/index.md#inactivity) of 10 minutes. Configuring the session security in this
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manner would mean if the cookie age was more than 2 hours or if the user was inactive for more than 10 minutes the
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session would be destroyed.
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### Additional proxy protection measures
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You can also apply the following headers to your proxy configuration for improving security. Please read the
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relevant documentation for these headers before applying them blindly.
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#### nginx
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```
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# We don't want any credentials / TOTP secret key / QR code to be cached by
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# the client
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add_header Cache-Control "no-store";
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add_header Pragma "no-cache";
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# Clickjacking / XSS protection
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# We don't want Authelia's login page to be rendered within a <frame>,
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# <iframe> or <object> from an external website.
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add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN";
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# Block pages from loading when they detect reflected XSS attacks.
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add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block";
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```
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#### Traefik 2.x - Kubernetes CRD
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```yaml
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---
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apiVersion: traefik.containo.us/v1alpha1
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kind: Middleware
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metadata:
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name: headers-authelia
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spec:
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headers:
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browserXssFilter: true
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customFrameOptionsValue: "SAMEORIGIN"
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customResponseHeaders:
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Cache-Control: "no-store"
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Pragma: "no-cache"
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---
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apiVersion: traefik.containo.us/v1alpha1
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kind: IngressRoute
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metadata:
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name: authelia
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spec:
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entryPoints:
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- http
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routes:
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- match: Host(`auth.example.com`) && PathPrefix(`/`)
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kind: Rule
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priority: 1
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middlewares:
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- name: headers-authelia
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namespace: authelia
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services:
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- name: authelia
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port: 80
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```
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#### Traefik 2.x - docker-compose
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```yaml
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services:
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authelia:
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labels:
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- "traefik.http.routers.authelia.middlewares=authelia-headers"
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- "traefik.http.middlewares.authelia-headers.headers.browserXssFilter=true"
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- "traefik.http.middlewares.authelia-headers.headers.customFrameOptionsValue=SAMEORIGIN"
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- "traefik.http.middlewares.authelia-headers.headers.customResponseHeaders.Cache-Control=no-store"
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- "traefik.http.middlewares.authelia-headers.headers.customResponseHeaders.Pragma=no-cache"
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```
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### More protections measures with fail2ban
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If you are running fail2ban, adding a filter and jail for Authelia can reduce load on the application / web server.
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Fail2ban will ban IPs exceeding a threshold of repeated failed logins at the firewall level of your host. If you are
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using Docker, the Authelia log file location has to be mounted from the host system to the container for
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fail2ban to access it.
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Create a configuration file in the `filter.d` folder with the content below. In Debian-based systems the folder is
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typically located at `/etc/fail2ban/filter.d`.
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```
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# Fail2Ban filter for Authelia
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# Make sure that the HTTP header "X-Forwarded-For" received by Authelia's backend
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# only contains a single IP address (the one from the end-user), and not the proxy chain
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# (it is misleading: usually, this is the purpose of this header).
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# the failregex rule counts every failed login (wrong username or password) and failed TOTP entry as a failure
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# the ignoreregex rule ignores debug, info and warning messages as all authentication failures are flagged as errors
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[Definition]
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failregex = ^.*Error while checking password for.*remote_ip=<HOST> stack.*
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^.*Credentials are wrong for user .*remote_ip=<HOST> stack.*
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^.*Wrong passcode during TOTP validation.*remote_ip=<HOST> stack.*
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ignoreregex = ^.*level=debug.*
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^.*level=info.*
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^.*level=warning.*
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```
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Modify the `jail.local` file. In Debian-based systems the folder is typically located at `/etc/fail2ban/`. If the file
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does not exist, create it by copying the jail.conf `cp /etc/fail2ban/jail.conf /etc/fail2ban/jail.local`. Add an
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Authelia entry to the "Jails" section of the file:
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```
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[authelia]
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enabled = true
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port = http,https,9091
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filter = authelia
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logpath = /path-to-your-authelia.log
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maxretry = 3
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bantime = 1d
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findtime = 1d
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chain = DOCKER-USER
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```
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If you are not using Docker remove the line "chain = DOCKER-USER". You will need to restart the fail2ban service for the
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changes to take effect.
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## Container privilege de-escalation
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Authelia will run as the root user and group by default, there are two options available to run as a non-root user and
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group.
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It is recommended which ever approach you take that to secure the sensitive files Authelia requires access to that you
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make sure the chmod of the files does not inadvertently allow read access to the files by users who do not need access
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to them.
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Examples:
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If you wanted to run Authelia as UID 8000, and wanted the GID of 9000 to also have read access to the files
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you might do the following assuming the files were in the relative path `.data/authelia`:
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```shell
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chown -r 8000:9000 .data/authelia
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find .data/authelia/ -type d -exec chmod 750 {} \;
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find .data/authelia/ -type f -exec chmod 640 {} \;
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```
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If you wanted to run Authelia as UID 8000, and wanted the GID of 9000 to also have write access to the files
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you might do the following assuming the files were in the relative path `.data/authelia`:
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```shell
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chown -r 8000:9000 .data/authelia
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find .data/authelia/ -type d -exec chmod 770 {} \;
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find .data/authelia/ -type f -exec chmod 660 {} \;
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```
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### Docker user directive
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The docker user directive allows you to configure the user the entrypoint runs as. This is generally the most secure
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option for containers as no process accessible to the container ever runs as root which prevents a compromised container
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from exploiting unnecessary privileges.
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The directive can either be applied in your `docker run` command using the `--user` argument or by
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the docker-compose `user:` key. The examples below assume you'd like to run the container as UID 8000 and GID 9000.
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Example for the docker CLI:
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```shell
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docker run --user 8000:9000 -v /authelia:/config authelia/authelia:latest
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```
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Example for docker-compose:
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```
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version: '3.8'
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services:
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authelia:
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image: authelia/authelia
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container_name: authelia
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user: 8000:9000
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volumes:
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- ./authelia:/config
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```
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Running the container in this way requires that you manually adjust the file owner at the very least as described above.
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If you do not do so it will likely cause Authelia to exit immediately. This option takes precedence over the PUID and
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PGID environment variables below, so if you use it then changing the PUID and PGID have zero effect.
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### PUID/PGID environment variables using the entrypoint
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The second option is to use the `PUID` and `PGID` environment variables. When the container entrypoint is executed
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as root, the entrypoint automatically runs the Authelia process as this user. An added benefit of using the environment
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variables is the mounted volumes ownership will automatically be changed for you. It is still recommended that
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you run the find chmod examples above in order to secure the files even further especially on servers multiple people
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have access to.
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The examples below assume you'd like to run the container as UID 8000 and GID 9000.
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Example for the docker CLI:
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```shell
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docker run -e PUID=1000 -e PGID=1000 -v /authelia:/config authelia/authelia:latest
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```
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Example for docker-compose:
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```
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version: '3.8'
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services:
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authelia:
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image: authelia/authelia
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container_name: authelia
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environment:
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PUID: 1000
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PGID: 1000
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volumes:
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- ./authelia:/config
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```
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[HSTS]: https://www.nginx.com/blog/http-strict-transport-security-hsts-and-nginx/
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